
50X1-HUM



Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy	Approved for Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201240001	-7

Page 4 of 6 Pages 50X1-HUM

Aerial Reconnaissance of Nuclear Attack Means in the Mountains by

General-Mayor of Aviation I. Lugovtsev
Colonel L. Astapchik

We would like to share some experience in the organization of aerial reconnaissance of nuclear attack means located in a mountainous theater of military operations.*

Reconnaissance flights have shown that under mountainous conditions it is very difficult to detect these means: wooded, sharply broken terrain and large, dense shadows in the morning and evening hours contribute to their reliable camouflage. Therefore, for conducting reconnaissance each crew was assigned only two areas, a main one and an alternate, the alternate area of one crew being the main one for the other. In this way each area was observed twice, which increased the reliability and dependability of the reconnaissance.

It was established that for one pass in an area not larger than 40 square kilometers, a crew in the course of a three-minute flight managed to make a reconnaissance of no more than two targets (this in a case where the crew could spend three to five minutes keying the maps to the terrain before entering the reconnaissance area). As a rule, the crews managed to complete the reconnaissance in an assigned area in two or three passes.

50X1-HUM

*This article mainly makes use of the experience of a joint exercise of the rocket troops and reconnaissance aviation which was carried out in May 1966 during unfavorable weather in mountainous-wooded terrain located 500 to 1,800 meters above sea level and broken up by ridges and spurs of mountains, hollows and ravines. IL-28R, IL-28, MIG-15R-bis aircraft, and MI-1 helicopters took part in the reconnaissance flights.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A	Approved for Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201240001-7
·	
	Page 5 of 6 Pages
reconnaissance data addressees was 15 mi	ne spent by a crew in flight in processing on one to two detected targets and transmitting them to nutes for single-seat aircraft and 11 minutes for (after entering the reconnaissance area).*
percent of all nucle	anks to the skilful activities of the crews, almost 80 ear strike means were detected and their coordinates accuracy of from 40 to 150 meters.
was the advance prep features of the reli	argely to the successful fulfilment of reconnaissance varation of large-scale maps by the crews. Well defined the efform of the same time contributed to the le assigned task.
missile launchers at determined with an e noted that largely comissile and missile-employed insufficien example, monotone (ureveal a target by the Indamp weather brantarget for a limit of sharply from the nat missiles and carrier placed vertically contact the example of the sharply from the nat missiles and carrier placed vertically contact the example of the exam	was devoted to determining the readiness time of a launch sites. In 70 percent of the cases it was error limit of 15 to 20 minutes. True, it has to be contributing to this was the poor camouflage of the etechnical units and subunits being reconnoitered, which the effective table-of-equipment camouflage means. For ingarnished camouflage nets in dry weather sharply their geometric outlines and contrast with the terrain. In the and green grass thrown on a net camouflage a of one to 1.5 hours and then it all begins to stand out the tributes to the determination of its location. In that camouflaged nuclear attack targets are best are and aircraft crews from an altitude of 100 to 300 altitudes, the possibilities of their detection are

*It takes considerable time to draft radio messages from secure troop control documents with reencoding of target coordinates taken from a map with a scale of 1:100,000, and the whole process of encoding is relatively complicated, especially for single-seat aircraft. Without reencoding of coordinates, the time of transmission of one report does not exceed a minute.

50X1-HUM

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000201240001-7
50X1-HUM of 6 Pages
As is well known, during the interpretation of aerial photographs very much time usually is spent on keying the photographed target to the terrain. In order to reduce this time, it is advisable to conclude the photographing of a detected target at the time when the plane is over a distinctive feature on the map (this will, of course, increase the consumption of film and developing time, but it will significantly facilitate the keying of targets and the determination of their coordinates).
Finally, the experience of aerial reconnaissance in mountains has once again confirmed the necessity of establishing at one of the airfields of the air army a joint photogrammetric center capable of quickly interpreting photographs and reporting exhaustive data to the staff of the rocket troops and artillery by radio (with the use of a radio especially allocated for this); the center would be headed by an officer of the staff of the rocket troops and artillery who knows the organization, the fundamentals of employment, and the reconnaissance indicators of nuclear attack means well.
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM